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T he most important example of the problems relating to the protection of the environment relative to non-international conflicts in to day's world is the 
experience of the ongoing conflict in former-Yugoslavia. This conflict has 
dominated the news for the past five years, ever since the beginning of the breakup 
of the former State of Yugoslavia. It has riveted the attention of the United Nations, 
of NATO, and of other great, or not so great, powers remaining after the breakup 
of the Soviet Empire. Thousands of people have died in the conflict, more 
thousands have been uprooted from their homes. Terrible atrocities have occurred, 
the like of which have been unknown in Europe since the end of the Second World 
War. And, it can be said without hesitation, there has been a profound effect on 
the environment. The extent of this is not known and will probably not be known 
until long after the conflict is finished. But, the fact that so many military forces 
have been involved, that battles have been fought by irregular forces without the 
discipline of conventional armies, that whole populations have been moved in the 
form of so called "ethnic cleansing," that so many atrocities have occurred and, on 
the other hand, that so many peacekeeping forces have also been involved in trying 
to control the conflict could not help but have a profound effect upon the 
environment of the area where the conflict is taking place. 
Before a discussion of the environmental issues, it is necessary to examine the 
type of conflict involved. The conflict is a struggle for the control of the territory 
of a State, Yugoslavia, which disintegrated after the end of the Cold War. This 
struggle has resulted in the birth of several new nations - Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia 
(or the Yugoslav Republic), and Macedonia. The birth of these new nations have 
taken place within the framework of the conflict of fighting between, at first, the 
Yugoslav (or Serbian) Army with Slovenia, and then with Croatia. The latter is a 
conflict which is still not finished. Most importantly, the fighting has expanded 
with great ferocity in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Bosnian government is trying 
to create a State which is being bitterly disputed by the Serbs and by the Croatians 
living in Bosnia, and by the Bosnian Muslims who support the new State. The 
United Nations has intervened in what has become the most extensive 
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peacekeeping mission in history and has sent thousands of peacekeepers who are 
trying vainly to moderate the conflict and to protect the extensive humanitarian 
relief operations being conducted for the benefit of the effected population. It has 
issued one decree after another, calling upon the parties to stop the fighting and 
to respect the humanitarian efforts, and creating protected or safe areas. l 
The peacekeepers have been involved in the fighting in an unprecedented way, 
being forced to respond in self-defense, to threaten the use of force to accomplish 
their mission, and have even most recently been held as hostages by both sides to 
the conflict. This has led to the debate over whether the "peacekeeping" mission 
should be expanded to a "peacemaking" mission.2 It has involved the use of NATO 
forces to support the peacekeepers and to try to protect them. All of the above raises 
the question of whether this is really a non-international conflict.3 It could quickly 
develop into an international conflict, but for the moment the great nations have 
stayed out of the fighting and have limited their action to support of the 
peacekeepers, and when they intervene it is clearly stated to be in support of U.N. 
peacekeeping resolutions. It is significant to note that this is a type of conflict 
which seems to be part of the new state of world order (or disorder), with active 
U.N. intervention on an unprecedented scale. It is also significant that this may 
be the wave of the future, and that the U.N. or other bodies such as NATO will 
intervene in peacekeeping or peacemaking actions where the regular rules of 
international conflicts may not be applied. Even with the intervention of outside 
States, the peacekeeping nature of the conflict places it firmly in the category of 
non-international conflicts, or what is also being called here "military operations 
other than war.,,4 
The second point which should be considered before proceeding further is to 
look quickly at the numerous and complex nature of actions taken by the U.N. and 
nations involved in the conflict.5 First of all, there is the U.N. peacekeeping effort. 
The U.N. originally intervened to keep apart the Croatians and the Serbians, and 
set up the protected areas within Croatia, which were until recently controlled by 
the local Serbs. It then intervened to protect humanitarian relief efforts within 
Bosnia. NATO and other individual nations intervened based upon U.N. 
resolutions to enforce an embargo in the form of the ongoing naval operation 
known as Sharp Guard. Then NATO also intervened in the air action known as 
Operation Deny Flight, which enforces a no-fly zone over Bosnia and which 
intervenes upon call to protect U.N. forces. There also is the separate U.S. 
operation known as Provide Promise, which operates an air bridge to Sarajevo and 
has dropped thousands of tons of supplies to besieged areas. This relief effort is 
not only U.S. supported, but other nations have joined in, and the air relief of 
Sarajevo has now surpassed the length of the Berlin airlift. Other planning has 
been ongoing to enforce a peace plan, to conduct a withdrawal of the U.N. forces, 
or to conduct other more specific evacuation or support missions, and most 
Burger 335 
recently to respond to developments such as the fall of the safe areas of Srebrenica 
and Zepa and the threat to Gorozda and Bihac. 
Why all of this is important here is because it is the framework within which 
measures to protect the environment during the conflict have been, or perhaps 
should have been, taken. We can ask to what extent the U.N. and other nations 
should intervene to protect the environment during a bitter non-international 
conflict. What rules apply to the forces which are acting as peacekeepers? What 
environmental problems do they face, and how practically can they regulate their 
actions to comply with international standards to protect the environment? Due 
to the fact that the U.N. and the participating nations have been concentrating on 
the basic issue of trying to bring peace to the region and to aid the local population 
and the refugees, it should be admitted that the environment has not been the 
main issue with which they have been concerned. However, it is an issue which 
has not been neglected by the peacekeepers because, as will be indicated, the 
international rules of law have been recognized, and the U.N. and NATO 
participants have included in their plans and the rules governing those plans that 
international law will be observed. What is proposed in this paper is to look at how 
the rules have been recognized, whether and to what extent they have been applied, 
and what we can learn from this experience. 
First, has the environment been affected? There is not here the case of a 
deliberate action to do something to alter the environment, such as the decision 
by Iraq to set fire to the oil wells in Kuwait. But, there has been such intense 
fighting throughout Bosnia that the destruction of towns, farms, and countryside 
is inevitable. Some of it is caused by random shelling, and also by the deliberate 
effort to force populations out of areas which one side or the other wishes to claim 
as its own. Since the fighting is so desperate and the forces for much part 
nonprofessional, control over what individuals or individual units do is sometimes 
minimal. On the other hand, even the peacekeepers affect the environment by the 
very scale of their operations which include building camps, continuously moving 
large convoys over a rudimentary road system, and trying to keep all of this 
supplied by land, sea, and clir. There is also the embargo operation ongoing in the 
Adriatic which involves an unprecedented number of ships from many different 
nations, operating closely and continuously in a limited area of sea. This raises the 
problems of oil spills and discharges from the ships and other mishaps relative to 
naval operations. Lastly, there is also the air operation which could quickly affect 
the environment if not carefully controlled. The bombing of targets, and even 
airdropping supplies, may damage the environment. Air operations might involve 
the carrying of hazardous cargoes, and there is always the possibility of pollution 
involving airports and facilities. 
This paper addresses the problem by looking at the practical ways the 
participating forces have endeavored to recognize and to follow the environmental 
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ru1es. For all of the operations mentioned, from the U.N. peacekeeping effort to 
the naval embargo and the enforcement of the no-fly zone, there are operations 
plans and ru1es of engagement.6 These are drawn up for the particular mission, 
such as the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia by the U.N., the NATO embargo 
operation in the Adriatic, or the air operation which enforces the no-fly zone or 
comes to the aid of the peacekeepers. The operation plans describe the mission 
and how it is to be accomplished. They spell out the commander's intent, and set 
the rules which will govern the operation. They have a whole series of annexes, 
from personnel to logistics, but what is most important here is that there will be 
a Ru1es of Engagement Annex to set out rules for the use of force, and a Legal 
Annex to address legal issues involved with the operation. These plans are 
reviewed by attorneys working on the staff of the commanders to assure that they 
properly conform with international and national laws and regulations. It is 
significant that there are legal advisers serving with the U.N., with NATO, and 
with national military units. 
From my own experience as Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) 
Legal Advisor, I can assure that each of these plans, whether it is the U.N. plan 
for peacekeeping or the NATO plans for the naval or air operations mentioned 
above, or the U.S. plans which govern U.S. forces, recognize the obligation to 
conform to international law. This includes the laws governing armed conflict and 
would also include both the specific and customary rules in regard to the protection 
of the environment. Operation plans are further developed by specific national 
rules on how operations are carried out. This would include rules applying to the 
precautions taken by naval ships not to discharge pollutants into the seas. In the 
air, this would include ru1es relating to the transportation of hazardous cargoes. 
On land, they would include rules on the handling of petroleum products and the 
prevention of spills. It wou1d also include the rules applying to cleanup if there 
are accidents. How well nations will carry out their obligations in this regard 
depends on how well their environmental programs are developed. The U.S., for 
example, has a very sophisticated environmental program for its armed forces, 
carries out very detailed studies on how its military operations affect the 
environment in overseas locations, and determines to what extent they comply 
with local environmental regulations? 
As mentioned above, operations plans include rules of engagement which 
govern the conduct of the military forces during the operations.8 These will also 
recognize the obligation to be in conformity with international law, specifically 
those governing armed conflict. They will set limits on the use of fire power, what 
are legitimate targets, and who can authorize firing upon targets. In this regard 
targets must be legitimate military objectives. The civilian population, and civilian 
facilities, or the countryside, would not be a target unless the civilians take up arms 
and become combatants, or the civilian facilities were put to military use. Limits 
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to assure that this is understood by both commanders and soldiers are part of every 
set of rules of engagement. The rules of engagement will also limit the weapons 
which may be used. Chemical weapons may be forbidden or limited to certain 
types, such as riot control agents, for use only in certain limited circumstances. 
Specific rules are established for each part of the operation, so that there are land, 
air and sea rules of engagement, each addressing the particular problems associated 
with that part of the operation. While not all these rules relate directly to the 
environment, they are important since they limit the use of force which may affect 
the environment. 
It is important to note both the differences and the similarities between the 
U.N., and the NATO or national rules of engagement. The U.N. rules basically 
are peacekeeping rules, that is, the use of force is normally only allowed in 
self-defense. Peacekeepers are supposed to withdraw from conflict if they are 
confronted with it. However, the NATO rules and national rules generally allow 
the use of force to accomplish the mission, not only in self-defense. This has led 
to long debates over whether the U.N. rules should be expanded, or how the NATO 
rules should be limited.9 In any case, even the NATO rules which are being 
planned for possible NATO participation are designed only to use force for specific 
missions such as enforcement of the embargo, the no-fly zone, evacuations, 
delivery of aid, or protection of peacekeepers. The most recent use of force by 
NATO has been the action taken in response to the Bosnian-Serb attack upon the 
Sarajevo market which killed and wounded numerous people. NATO acted to 
force the Bosnian Serbs to respect Sarajevo as a safe area. lO The U.N. rules may, 
on the other hand, have been expanded for the U.N. Rapid Reaction Force which 
is being assigned new missions and needs more authority to use force to accomplish 
these missions. In either case, for NATO or for the U.N. the rules are limited, since 
the mission is limited. This is significant for the protection of the environment 
because if the mission is limited, the effect that the use of force could have on the 
. environment is also limited. 
At this point, it is necessary to ask what are the specific rules which apply in 
regard to rules of engagement and the duty to protect the environment in 
non-international conflicts.u Most of the specific provisions on environmental 
rules in armed conflict are found in the Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.12 
However, it is relevant here that Additional Protocol II, relative to 
non-international conflicts, does not have the particular provisions relating to the 
environment that are found in Additional Protocol I. Missing from Additional 
Protocol II is the basic rule in Article 3513 that it is prohibited to employ methods 
or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause "widespread, 
longterm and severe damage to the natural environment." Also missing is Article 
5514 which states that care must be taken in warfare to protect the natural 
environment against "widespread, long-term and severe damage." This article 
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prohibits the use of methods or means of warfare intended or which may be 
expected to cause such damage to the natural environment. Also attacks against 
the natural environment by means of reprisals are prohibited. Additional Protocol 
II, on the other hand, sets out only fundamental guarantees. There are provisions 
forbidding acts directed against the civilian population, such as prohibitions 
against the taking of hostages, acts of terrorism, collective punishment, forced 
movement of populations, and pillage but no specific provisions on the 
environment. The only provisions which might have some relevance to the 
environment are Articles 14 and 15.15 Article 14 protects objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population. This article protects agricultural areas, 
crops, livestock, drinking water installations, and irrigation works. Article 15 
protects works and installations containing dangerous forces. 
In general, Additional Protocol II sets up only minimum guarantees, but these 
rules were designed for irregular forces or for regular forces fighting irregular 
forces inside their own country.16 This does not mean that military forces 
participating in peacekeeping operations should not observe the more extensive 
guarantees provided for in Additional Protocol I, especially in a conflict such as 
the one ongoing in former-Yugoslavia, which is so close to becoming an 
international conflict, and especially by United Nations forces and other nations 
representing the world community. In fact, the rules of engagement being used by 
the peacekeeping forces in former-Yugoslavia and the rules proposed for NATO 
forces acting in support of the U.N. do not make a distinction between 
international and non-international conflicts. While not going into specific 
provisions of these rules, I note that the more general provisions of Additional 
Protocol I are a basic underlying consideration in the relevant rules of engagement. 
Examples include the basic rule in Article 3517 that the right to chose methods or 
means of warfare is not unlimited. There is also Article 4818 providing the duty 
to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between 
civilian objects and military objectives. There are also Article 51,19 which provides 
against indiscriminate attacks, and Article 5720 in regard to precautions to be taken 
in planning attacks. And, fmally, there is Article 8221 which provides a 
requirement for the provision and use oflegal advisers. All are cited in Hans Peter 
Gasser's recent article which suggests the publication of "Guidelines for military 
manuals and instructions for the protection of the environment" for military forces 
involved in armed conflict.22 
Aside from the Additional Protocols, the other document which is basic to the 
protection of the environment is the 1977 Environmental Modification 
Convention (ENMOD),23 which contains language similar to that found in 
Additional Protocol I. The ENMOD Convention prohibits environmental 
modification "techniques" designed to result in widespread, longlasting and 
severe effects on the environment.24 The ENMOD agreement only applies to 
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signatory powers. And it is extremely limited in coverage since it forbids only what 
might be referred to as a "manipulation" of the environment, a deliberate 
undertaking to make longlasting or permanent changes. What is interesting to 
note here it that it sets out a general principle which should be recognized under 
all circumstances. There is not one rule for international conflicts and another for 
non-international conflicts. It would also just as well apply to operations in time 
of peace. While it may not be very practical because of its limitations, and it 
certainly will not find application in the ongoing conflict in former-Yugoslavia, 
it stands for the fact that there are general environmental rules which would apply 
to this conflict however it is classified, and there is good reason for peacekeeping 
forces to observe it and other provisions relating to the environment. 
Lastly, there is the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention with its Protocol 
II on mines, booby traps, and other devices, and Protocol III on incendiary 
weapons which, in addition to limiting use of particular weapons, prohibits 
making forests and plant cover objects of attack except when used for military 
purposes.25 
The rules of engagement of the peacekeeping forces and the rules planned for 
other forces do utilize and apply these general principles, and the lack of specificity 
in Additional Protocol II does not mean that they are disregarded because this 
may be a non-international conflict. I suggest that any peacekeeping force will 
adopt and follow such provisions of Additional Protocol I no matter how we 
classify the conflict. They would also apply to military operations other than war. 
It is most significant that the forces involved as peacekeepers are regular military 
forces and are part of an international peacekeeping mission. They should be held 
to a higher standard. There may be some exceptions since, for example, it may not 
be practical to apply all of the provisions of Additional Protocol I or of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. Specifically, particular provisions of the Geneva Convention 
on Prisoners of War26 may not be applicable. The taking of prisoners is not 
contemplated by peacekeepers. Peacekeepers will not operate POW camps. 
However, the general provisions in regard to distinguishing targets, taking 
precautions in planning, and the use oflegal advisers are all applicable. Again, they 
are important here because they will serve to protect the environment if they are 
properly utilized. Deliberate destruction of the environment without military 
need would be forbidden in all cases. The destruction of the environment of a 
widespread, long-term or severe nature should always be forbidden. 
As indicated above, operations plans discuss areas other than rules of 
engagement. As mentioned earlier, there is a need to address special problems, 
such as those involving the use of ships at sea. It is generally expected of the 
commanders of military vessels that they will recognize and follow the 
international rules of the sea. In this regard, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
clearly provides that States have the obligation to protect and preserve the 
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environment (Article 192).21 They shall also take measures to prevent, control and 
reduce pollution of the marine environment (Article 194).28 This includes the 
control of the release of pollutants from vessels, dumping wastes, prevention of 
accidents, and preventing pollution from installations. This obligation is observed 
by NATO nations involved in Operation Sharp Guard. In regard to air operations, 
an important concern would be the transportation of hazardous materials. While 
not as extensive as the Law of the Sea Convention, the Basel Convention on 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal provides rules 
in this regard.29 Again, military commanders would be obliged to observe 
international legal rules. In such extensive operations as Deny Flight or Provide 
Promise there are borders to be crossed, permissions to be granted in obtaining 
flight clearances, and precautions to be taken in transporting arms and munitions 
which may certainly be considered as hazardous. Accidents must be prevented, 
and installations where the materials are stored kept safe. All of these are factors 
which need to be considered in planning operations. 
There is another area which needs to be addressed, and that is the responsibility 
for environmental damages. It has already been mentioned that each operations 
plan will contain a Legal Annex. This Annex will normally contain the rules in 
regard to the investigation and payment of claims.30 In regard to peacekeeping 
operations, the exception which normally applies to combat operations, that 
nations are not obliged to pay for damage caused, should not be applicable.31 This 
reasonably applies to the situation where opposing sides are fighting each other 
and will not reimburse each other for the damage caused in the fighting. In 
peacekeeping operations the normal claim is that of a third party injured during 
an operation conducted during conditions of general peace. The U.N. has a 
extensive claims program and has regularly been paying claims for damages caused 
during its operations. These range from the typical motor vehicle accident to 
damage to roads or farms, and therefore could be considered as environmental 
damage. The U.N. Legal Advisor at Zagreb informed me that they would not pay 
claims from actions taken properly in the line of duty-they would expect this 
expense to be assumed by the host country which benefits from the protection of 
the peacekeeping forces-but they would pay claims for damages caused by 
negligence or improper acts.32 Negligence claims would include liability for such 
things as oil spills or other pollution damage, and there has been at least one case 
of a environmental cleanup claim being paid.33 
Legal Annexes should provide how claims are to be paid and investigated. It is 
necessary that incidents be reported, and that an investigation be made to 
determine what the damages were, who caused them, and if they can be verified. 
There is also the question of who is liable. Ifit is a U.N. operation, will the U.N. 
be liable even if the particular damage was caused by a national unit acting in 
support of the U.N. forces? If damages were caused by forces under U.N. command, 
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there should be no question that the U.N. will accept responsibility, but it may 
refer claims back to national units if they were operating under national command 
even if in support of the U.N. The U.N. has referred claims to Joint Task Force 
Provide Promise as a U.S. operation and to AFSOUTH if NATO forces were 
involved. This, of course, may result in the fact that there will be differing policies 
on the payment of claims. In regard to claims referred to NATO, NATO may in 
turn refer them to its member States if they were responsible for the damages. 
There is a NATO claims formula set out in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 
(NATO SOFA),34 but the NATO SOFA may not be applicable to situations in 
former-Yugoslavia since this is an "out of area operation." Former-Yugoslavia is 
an area not within the scope of the NATO agreement. 
In any event, the issue of recognizing claims responsibility is extremely 
important. If there is a responsibility to pay claims, then there is also reason to try 
to prevent claims. The U.N., NATO or national bodies will be concerned to limit 
their liability, and there will be an effort to prevent the causes of claims. 
Precautions will be taken against accidents. There will be controls in regard to the 
handling of pollutants and cleaning up should accidents occur. This becomes 
difficult in the international setting, since, for example, the U.N. must try to set 
up controls and standards for a very diverse group of soldiers and units which 
make up the U.N. forces. It is easier within NATO, since NATO units are 
accustomed to working together, and there are longstanding and practiced rules 
applying to NATO units. It is easier still within national units since their rules 
apply only to their own soldiers and their own operations. But, the bottom line is 
that ifliability is anticipated, countries will do what they can to protect themselves 
from liability because they are responsible to pay for the damages which they cause. 
A third area of discussion in regard to operations in former-Yugoslavia and the 
environment concerns agreements with the host nation and also agreements 
between the participating parties. On one hand, there is the U.N. Model SOFA35 
which has been signed between the U.N. and the Government of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and more recently a similar agreement has also been signed with 
Croatia. This agreement provides in Article 636 that the U.N. forces will respect 
the law of the receiving State. This would include appropriate environmental laws. 
The U.N. agreement does not have claims provisions, but as already noted, the 
U.N. has an extensive claims program and will generally pay claims where there 
is fault involved. NATO forces supporting the peacekeeping mission would also 
be covered by the U.N. agreement when attached to U.N. forces. In the case that 
NATO intervened but not as part of the U.N. force, it would also have to have a 
SOFA. If modeled on the NATO SOFA, this agreement would also provide for 
the respect oflocallaw (Article 11).37 It would have claims provisions (Article VIII) 
which would set up a formula by which the contracting parties waive claims against 
each other, but agree to share the payment of third party claims.38 Of course, the 
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revelant agreement could be modeled on the U.N. agreement rather than the 
NATO model, or a different agreement entirely could be drafted. Another 
provision in the Model SOFA provides for immunity for military personnel from 
criminal or civil jurisdiction, leaving it to the international organization to be 
responsible for the acts of its personne1.39 The NATO SOFA provides for partial 
immunity, giving immunity for official acts, but allowing the most interested party 
to exercise jurisdiction for nonofficial acts.40 The significance here is that it is the 
State itself, rather than its personnel, which would have responsibility for most 
environmental offenses. 
The other type of agreement to be considered is one between the participating 
parties, such as a terms of reference agreement for forces participating in a U.N. 
operation.41 Again, in such an agreement, it would be appropriate for the forces 
to agree that they would respect the local laws of the country where the operation 
is taking place. The responsibility of the parties between each other could be 
dermed. For example, will the U.N. or NATO pay a claim which is derived from 
a U.N. operation, but where the specific damage has been caused by a member or 
a unit ofthe NATO force? Not a great deal of thought has been given as to how 
either of these two types of agreements (SOFA's or Terms of Reference) might 
relate to the environment. We could speculate what types of provisions should be 
added. The Model SOFA might, in its text, provide with particularity provisions 
in regard to the observance of environmental rules. The NATO SOFA, written in 
1951, does not refer specifically to environmental matters.42 Later NATO 
agreements, such as the recently signed Supplementary Agreement with Germany, 
do refer to environmental matters, stipulating a specific duty to comply with 
environmental laws and regulations.43 It would be possible to provide specifically 
for the respect for environmental laws in both peacekeeping SOFA's and 
agreements between peacekeeping forces. However, there must be caution here, 
because compliance with all environmental regulations, especially if a country 
where the actions were taking place had a sophisticated environmental protection 
system, might become burdensome and interfere with the missions to be 
accomplished. Exceptions to the rules might be necessary. 
These are only a few of the issues which have occurred, but there are 
generalizations from this discussion which can be made in regard to operations in 
tht: former-Republic of Yugoslavia and protection of the environment. First and 
most generally, environmental rules must apply to non-international as well as 
international conflicts. While the rules for non-international conflicts may not be 
so specific as for international conflicts, there should be a general rule in regard 
to all conflicts, that the environment is not to be deliberately damaged. It should 
also apply to all operations other than war. Included in this general rule should be 
the specific rules in regard to selecting targets and limiting collateral damage. 
Other rules are also applicable, such as Article 57 in regard to precautions in the 
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attack.44 This must be part of all military planning. There is also the rule in Article 
82 which requires the use oflegal advisers.45 They must advise commanders and 
review the plans for military operations. Again, these are basic rules, and there is 
no reason they should not apply to non-international conflicts and military 
operations other than war as well as to international conflicts. Policy should dictate 
in such operations that all the general rules apply. The Additional Protocol II rules 
are minimum standards, and that does not mean participating forces should not 
apply a higher standard. It is not unreasonable that nations participating for 
peacekeeping purposes should apply the highest standards to their conduct. 
Then there is a second generalization, in regard to the use of operations plans 
and rules of engagement. The plans and rules must recognize the duty to respect 
the law, both international and local laws, and these should include those which 
relate to the protection of the environment. The Rules of Engagement Annex is 
key because it sets out specific rules in regard to the use of force, and the Legal 
Annex because it sets out the rules which apply generally even when force is not 
being used. Aside from general international rules, I cited as example the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention46 and the Basel Convention.47 The Legal Annex also 
establishes rules in regard to such things as the payment of claims. And the 
recognition of the obligation to pay claims serves the important function of 
deterring acts which damage the environment because the parties will prevent 
those things which will cost them money. The third generalization concerns the 
use of status of forces agreements and agreements between participating forces, 
both of which should recognize the obligations to respect the law, and stipulate 
particular arrangements for such things as the investigation and reimbursement 
for claims. These agreements could also refer specifically to environmental laws 
and regulations. They could work out the details in regard to what extent local 
procedures are to be followed, such as applying for permits or following particular 
environmental rules. 
While the above generalizations may seem simple, they do establish a 
reasonable basis to observe environmental law in non-international conflicts and 
in military operations other than war. I note that all of the comments made in this 
paper have been drawn from my own experience and that of other legal advisers 
during the conflict in former-Yugoslavia. The suggested practices in operations 
plans and rules of engagement have been used by the U.N., by NATO, and by 
individual nations involved. The comments in regard to SOFA's and TOR's are 
also drawn from actual or proposed agreements. This experience has been used in 
operations taking place on a vast scale so that the lessons learned should be 
recognized as precedent for the future. Even if the intent of the operations, to 
preserve the peace and come to the aid of those suffering, fail, the experience gained 
in conducting these operations will remain. So whatever the outcome of the 
present experience in former-Yugoslavia, there may be some good which comes 
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from it in that we are being forced to address difficult situations which might have 
even wider consequences in conflicts in the future. It particularly applies to the 
environment. The opportunity exists to develop rules for these conflicts, and to 
recognize responsibilities for the future. Whatever is being developed is likely to 
be practical since it is being developed for actual ongoing conflicts. Real problems 
are being addressed, and it is hoped that we are left with some workable rules and 
experience which are valuable for the future. 
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